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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
hardly be expected that there would have been a different
decision if the term in this section were "delivered" or "fur-




There are different kinds of rules of law concerning the
loss or change of rights by reason of the lapse of time, but the
classification and characteristics of each have not been clearly
indicated. In the case of liberative prescription, the running of
the time is subject to interference through interruption and
suspension, and the prescription can be renounced after accrual.
However, in some cases, the running of time brooks no inter-
ference, and after the lapse of the stated period, the right is
completely lost.
In Cassiere v. Cuban Coffee Mills' this question of classifi-
cation of the nature of the prescription was directed at Article
3547 of the Civil Code, which provides that, in the absence of
appropriate revival proceedings, "all judgments for money...
shall be prescribed by the lapse of ten years." Petition to revive
a judgment was filed twenty years after its rendition and was
followed by allegations of interruption and suspension. After
tracing the history of the Civil Code article, and the fluctuating
jurisprudence, the court held that the only way to prevent
accrual of this prescription was by means of an action to revive
the judgment, stating, "[We] think it the wiser policy to regard
Article 3547 as sui generis and we attach no particular impor-
tance to the circumstance that, because it has been placed in
that part of the Civil Code which deals with the liberative
prescription, the articles pertaining to the interruption of pre-
scription are, or should be, applicable."'2
It is sometimes a necessary technique to make a present
policy decision as to which of two conflicting lines of jurispru-
dence should be followed. However, if the statement with ref-
erence to this article is implied for other Civil Code articles,
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 74 So.2d 193 (La. 1954).
2. Id. at 197.
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namely, that no significance is to be attached to the chapter
or section of the Civil Code of which it forms a part, it would
sound like a denial of the meaning of a civil code altogether.
The basic framework of a civil code is a system of classifica-
tion, and the importance of the location of an article cannot be
over-emphasized. It is true that this Article 3547 was not in
the Civil Code of 1825, only entering the Revised Civil Code of
1870 as the incorporation of Act 274 of 1853, and the court's con-
clusion to classify it as sui generis may well be the best solu-
tion. Nevertheless, it would be detrimental to a proper under-
standing of the nature of a civil code to let the court's state-
ment in this case serve in the future as a basis for an implica-
tion of wider and more general scope.
To support the position of the Cassiere case and to follow
the holding of Bailey v. Louisiana & N.W.R.R.,3 it is necessary
to consider obsolete certain provisions of Civil Code Article
2278. 4 Perhaps more study should be given to this point than
the assumption that the legislature approves this construction
because it has done nothing about the matter.
In the same Cassiere case, one of the plaintiff's conten-
tions was that the acknowledgments of the judgment debtor
kept alive the original debt by interrupting any prescription
that might be running against it. However, the court disposed
of that argument by pointing out that the original debt was
extinguished by the merger into the judgment, and that res
adjudicata would foreclose any action based on such a debt.5
A written promise to pay a judgment might create a valid new
obligation, but that is a different thing entirely.
The classification of the nature of the cause of action is
often the only real issue in a liberative prescription problem,
3. 159 La. 576, 105 So. 626 (1925).
4. "Parol evidence shall not be received:
"1. To prove any acknowledgment or promise to pay any judgment,
sentence or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction, * * * for the pur-
pose or in order to take such judgment, sentence or decree out of prescrip-
tion, or to revive the same, after prescription has run or been completed.
"But in all cases mentioned in this article, the acknowledgment or
promise to pay shall be proved by written evidence signed by the party
who is alleged to have made the acknowledgment or promise * * *." Art.
2278, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, as quoted in Cassiere v. Cuban Coffee Mills, 74
So.2d 193, 196 (La. 1954).
5. The exact meaning of "merger" and the scope of "res adjudicata"
in Louisiana civil law are not considered in these comments.
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because the applicable period of time is unequivocally stated
in the law. In Lafleur v. Brown6 the suit was for damages which
resulted from defendant's improper installation of a water pump
and failure to lower the depth in a well. The lower court sus-
tained the defendant's plea of one-year prescription against
tort actions. It is heartening that this plea of prescription was
overruled, thereby dealing a blow to the tendency of calling
the suit a tort action whenever damages are sought. The action
was classified as one for breach of contract, and the case was
remanded.
In the case of Pearlstine v. Mattes7 the judicially separated
wife brought suit against the husband to be recognized as co-
owner of two properties as community and for their partition
by licitation. There had been a purported partition of one, and
simulated transfers of the other, but after some years the record
title to both was back in the husband's name. Without going
through all of the facts and the husband's numerous arguments,
which proved of no avail, there is one point of interest for
mention here. As a bar to the wife's suit, the husband defendant
pleaded the ten-year liberative prescription against personal
actions." The court held that Civil Code Article 3544 did not
apply because this was a real action to have recognized the
plaintiff's ownership in certain immovables. In view of the
husband's obvious maneuvers to defraud his wife, the result
reached can only be commended. However, the question may
remain as to whether a separated (or divorced) spouse's right
to a separation of the community property is to be considered
real or personal depending upon which items of property are
involved.
AcQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
Generally, a dispute involving acquisitive prescription is
between two parties who have conflicting claims to the same
property. It is therefore unusual to find a case where one of the
parties has no claim and is trying to avoid the acquisition of
any interest in the property. In Cortinas v. Peters9 the defen-
dant's refusal to comply with a promise to purchase five lots
elicited from the plaintiff the assertion of the acquisitive pre-
scription of his authors in title as proof of his present valid
6. 223 La. 976, 67 So.2d 556 (1953).
7. 223 La. 1032, 67 So.2d 582 (1953).
8. Art. 3544, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
9. 224 La. 9, 68 So.2d 739 (1953).
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and merchantable title. There were twenty-four lots in the
square involved, and the original possessor went into possession
of the whole square although he had acquired only nineteen
of them. As to the five lots here in question, he took possession
as agent for the bank in which he was employed. The evidence
that later "he took that property as his own" was not enough
to change his precarious possession (for another) into a legal
possession (for himself) which is indispensable for any acquisi-
tive prescription." Of significant value in deciding future cases
is the court's clarification of the criteria that he "could not
become an adverse possessor in the absence of a showing that
he manifested such an intention by some unequivocal act of




In two cases the court was requested to give recognition
to the custody decree of another jurisdiction, and in both in-
stances this was refused. One was a foreign-country judgment
rendered in Panama, and the other was a sister-state judgment
from Tennessee. In the latter case, even the "full faith and
credit" clause offered no help. Custody decrees frequently fail
to finish the family fights for the offspring, because the desire
of one parent for its child is not dissipated by a judicial award
to the other. At the same time, courts usually seek a solution
in the best interests of the children. In a conflict of laws case
involving movement from one place to another, the question is
kept open by non-recognition of the custody decree previously
rendered in another jurisdiction. If, according to the general
principles of conflict of laws, the court which rendered the cus-
tody decree did not have jurisdiction to do so, the refusal to
recognize is simple enough. It is a little more involved but not
much more difficult to disregard the custody decree even of a
sister state and even where there may have been present all
the elements for jurisdiction.
10. Arts. 3436, 3441, 3446, 3489, 490, 3510, LA. CIVI CODE of 1870.
11. 224 La. 9, 14, 68 So.2d 739, 741 (1953).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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